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Abstract
This paper is written from the perspective of creative practitioners in sound, 
music and the visual arts teaching in UK higher education. Seeking ultimately to 
refine approaches both to the development of creative abilities, and to the formal 
evaluation of creative activity, the research forms part of a wider project exploring 
the formative and summative assessment of creative arts practice, the key focus 
being the study of creative value in the arts. As a consequence of the impact of new 
technologies and changing conceptions of creative technique, craft, collaboration 
and origination, and diversification of possible interpretive meanings inherent 
with new artistic forms, increasing uncertainty in the assessment and evaluation 
of creative practice and creative experience in artistic disciplines is inevitable. 
Reflected in the increasing complexity and diversity of approaches to arts-based 
disciplines in higher education, this contextual instability presents an exciting 
opportunity for learning, teaching, and curriculum design, but also a complex 
challenge for the formal assessment of creative activity. A difficult and arguably 
subjective term in and of itself, creativity, in the context of rapidly changing and 
evolving arts-based education systems, requires careful consideration in order to 
support effective pedagogic practice and assessment processes. 
Creativity models tend to emphasise utility and originality as the key factors 
in determining creative value; the wider recognition and impact of the outcomes 
of creative endeavour preeminent in the interpretation and attribution of quality 
and significance. Whilst most evident and analytically objectifiable in the study 
of reception and in the analysis of outcomes, creative practices and processes 
nevertheless feature more prominently in the interpretation of value in some 
fields. Whilst the products of the creative practice of artists, musicians and 
writers typically occupy the centre ground in the popular discourse of creativity, 
the authentication of creative endeavour is nevertheless closely connected to the 
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narratives surrounding the inception and development of the work and the security 
of the connection established between the creative object and originator. 
Investigating the potential for a meaningful definition of ‘authentic creativity’, 
notions of novelty, ignorance, forgery, fakery, reproduction and patterning, provide 
a basis for consideration of creativity as an essentially unstable concept and 
phenomenon that defies simple interpretation and evaluation. Considering the 
discourse of authenticity and aesthetics, this paper explores different perspectives 
of creativity as lived experience, applied process, and outcome, and positions 
analysis in the narratives of insight, imagination, discovery and talent. Presenting 
a discussion rooted in a context of collapsing distinctions between the natural and 
the artificial, the authentic and the inauthentic, the original and the copy, this text 
attempts to develop a broad definition of authentic creativity to frame future work 
in developing pedagogic practices. In order to support the development of creative 
ability, and to exercise critical judgement of creativity in the arts effectively, there 
are numerous elements that may well remain difficult to locate and to align with 
any pre-calibrated assessment criteria or rubric. Nevertheless, this paper presents 
the argument that all forms of creativity are valuable and that value can emerge 
from all forms of creative experience. Whilst some aspects of creativity will always 
remain open to subjective interpretation, even the mysterious and unknown can 
form essential features of creativity assessment and meaningful judgements of 
creative value.
Introduction
For a determination of creative value to take place, a creative act needs to 
occur (in a context) and the act itself needs to be appreciated (from a perspective). 
Determination events occur at the micro to the macro scale, at varying frequencies, 
and through considerable diversity of circumstances; through self-recognition of 
everyday activity, to more widespread external appreciation and assimilation over 
more extended timeframes. Consequently, creative value is clearly spectrum-based 
and subject to a significantly complex range of variables and determining factors 
related to any given framework of reception. Simply speaking, for creativity to exist, 
a series of points need to intersect, and, at the nexus of any successful intersection, 
there is at least the recognition of creativity as a possibility and a recognisable and 
definable perceptual experience. 
In education, artistic disciplines incorporate well established frameworks for 
the judgement of creative qualities. Citing Gusky (1996), Clark (2002) highlights 
the three key areas of consideration in the assessment of creativity in the arts as; 
product, process, and progress. Whilst competency indicators relating to formal 
evaluation of creative value have been refined through considerable application in 
increasing accountable practices of assessment in education (Boughton in Eisner 
and Day, 2004; Schmid, 2003), creative value nevertheless remains an uncertain and 
unstable concept, difficult to measure and quantify with efficacy and consistency, 
and subject to a tension between subjective and objective indicators. As observed 
by Amabile (1996) in discussion of ‘phenomenological response states’ and the work 
of Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi (1976), all educators operate judgement through 
encultured experience and particular levels of institutionalised expectations, 
reception biases (Lebuda and Karwowski, 2013), and general uncertainty of focus 
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between the anticipated and the unanticipated, between novelty and and ‘fit’ 
(Beghetto in Kaufman and Sternberg, 2010). 
The definition problem in the study of creativity--referred to as of continuing 
central significance in creativity research (Runco & Jaeger, 2012)--is one that 
remains inherently paradoxical in two key respects. Firstly, the essential nature 
of creativity being predicated on novelty, all general definitions ultimately seek to 
define that which as yet does not exist according to varying emphasis on impact or 
usefulness in specific contexts or domains, or indeed to generalise about creativity 
in retrospect. The basic problem being how to understand how things that didn’t 
exist come to exist, determining characteristics of creativity considered in advance 
of emergence can only draw from the language and rhetoric of previous reception 
experience for description, and the level of impact is perhaps the most obvious 
indicator of value. Secondly, and equally paradoxical, creativity is almost entirely 
obvious and identifiable in most cases. Whilst occasionally requiring some time for 
full appreciation, or ‘decoding’, the exceptional and the useful are more commonly 
transparently and evidently so, and the challenge is often to describe in words what 
from a conceptual level is instinctively appreciated (it seems so obviously creative). 
Identifying creativity is often not the problem, defining the experience, the precise 
relationship with the previous state, and decoding the processes necessary for 
reproducing the outcomes or useful variations, remain more challenging questions. 
Creativity may ultimately be “impossible to define in words” (Bohm, 1996), or at 
least words that provide for more than poetic description and record. Nevertheless, 
attributing the origins of the widely accepted ‘standard definition’ of creativity to 
Barron (1955) and Stein (1953) in particular, Runco and Jaeger (2012) outline the 
essential character of creativity being determined by the presence of an appropriate 
and interdependent balance between novelty and effectiveness. Also neatly 
expressing the wider context of reception as being significant in determining the 
“costs and benefits of contrarianism” at any given time (Ibid: 92), the codification 
of novelty according to particular levels of ‘uncommonness’ and determination 
of ‘usefulness’ according to specific circumstances is critical to understanding 
creativity in any given context. As observed by Csikszentmihalyi, “Creativity is any 
act, idea, or product that changes an existing domain into [a] new one. And the 
definition of a creative process is: someone whose thoughts or actions change a 
domain, or establish a new one” (1997, in Clegg, 2008, p. 220). Different forms 
of creativity have been identified relating both to different personality types and 
different subject disciplines within a higher education context; The “free” domains 
of many arts and the more “constrained” disciplines of architecture, design and, 
arguably, music, each involving different conceptions and processes of creativity 
(Gluck et. al, 2002). Creativity is, ultimately, a continuum (McWilliam and Dawson, 
2008: 636) of different activities all defined by the emergence of new and useful 
ideas. 
Considering creative value
A generally utilitarian discourse is evident in most analysis of creative value. 
From the arts to commerce, education to science, given that creativity itself is 
most commonly associated with domain-based appreciation, an impact-based 
perspective is perhaps entirely understandable. Indeed, as observed by Gregory 
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Bateson, “The meaning of your communication is the response you get” (1972). 
Creative organisations are more productive and more innovative, creative solutions 
are more efficient and more effective, creative artefacts are more efficient and 
commercially successful. It is therefore inevitable that creativity would focus on 
where it is most visible and identifiable and more objectifiable and quantifiable. 
Ultimately, “Creativity is social construct—its products need public acceptance” 
(Tornkvist, 1998, p. 10). Creativity would most certainly not get the press is does if 
it were not as useful as it was. 
There are hundreds of established creativity tests and a wide range of research 
on the efficacy of different models (Cropley, 2010). As observed by Plucker and 
Makel (in Kaufman & Sternberg, 2010) established measures of creativity can 
be broadly categorised into two types: assessment of cognitive-affective skills 
including the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking, and tests designed in relation to 
the exploration of aspects of personality type or syndrome. Highlighting a series 
of broader distinctions between convergent and divergent thinking as measurable 
factors in controlled testing alongside factors such as creative fluency and problem 
solving, Plucker and Makel identify the considerable integrity of the psychometric 
data and psychological research but also highlight the criterion problem in all study 
of creativity. In any study of creative value, there are grey areas where determination 
becomes subject to more fluid boundaries of definition and interpretation. The 
dilemma of creative evaluation is one defined by moving ground, surface quality, 
subjectivity and reinterpretation, and, as highlighted previously, the underlying 
paradox of novelty. Each new act of transformational creativity produces a new 
reality against which a fresh assessment of value needs to be made. Unless 
adopting a purely mechanistic and materialistic view of creativity and simply 
mapping assessment methods to the measurable impact on human well-being (and 
ultimately simply deferring ambiguity to a point further down a semantic chain of 
description), there will always be scope for perspective to influence interpretation. 
Boden (1998) characterises three broad types of creativity; 1) Improbable, 2) 
Exploratory, and, 3) Transformational, demarking broad boundaries between the 
more spontaneous (1), the focused and discipline-based (2), and the ultimately 
profound and significant (3). Kaufman and Beghetto’s ‘4C’ model (2009) also 
provides a practical conceptual framework distinguishing between the everyday and 
the individual activity of developing new ideas (or ‘mini-c’), and progressively more 
mature levels of creativity through educational competence (‘little-c’), professional 
application (‘Pro-c’), and the most enigmatic forms of creativity leading to impact 
and germinal change to all of humanity at the ‘Big-C’ level. Correspondingly, Silvia 
et al (2012) present a significant evaluation of self-report scales in the assessment 
of creative value and the issue of consensus. Exploring the Creative Achievement 
Questionnaire, the Biographical Inventory of Creative Behaviors, the revised Creative 
Behavior Inventory and the Creative Domain Questionnaire, they argue that the 
close correlation of each assessment method underpins validity and that self-
report mechanisms provide a secure basis for the determination of creative value. 
Further reflecting the taxonomic tendency towards groups of three or four, Amabile 
(1996), citing Jackson and Messick (1965), introduces their notion that ‘outstanding 
creativity’ is essentially a combination of four aesthetic responses: 1) Surprise 
(novelty); 2) Satisfaction (suitability); 3) Stimulation (breaking the boundaries); 
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and, 4) Savoring (elegance and emotional meaning). Creative events are merely 
those that elicit these forms of responses and creative ability that which is capable 
of producing this form of impact. Reception and experience matter ultimately in 
the development of a consensus of creative value determination in educational 
contexts in particular. Creative value is a dynamic and unpredictable concept reliant 
on numerous factors and creative assessment clearly more secure when dealing 
with explicitly ‘original’ utilisation of established and well understood mechanisms, 
conventions, materials, or frameworks, and tangibly more challenging when dealing 
with the unfamiliar and the unusual, open to subjectivity and interpretation. The 
unfamiliar is much more palatable when it ‘works’ and quite alien and certainly 
marginalised as a minority pursuit when it doesn’t. 
Ambiguities in the assessment of creativity
However difficult to predict or evaluate, that creativity is a natural phenomenon 
is clear. Scientific research in genetics, evolutionary biology, and indeed particle 
physics, is increasingly demonstrating that spontaneous variation is a natural 
phenomenon from the cosmic to the neurological scale and that diversification is 
an inevitable consequence of natural processes over time. Whilst this position is 
subject to challenge perhaps from different theological perspectives, it is sufficient 
to establish that, from a scientific perspective, there is no requirement to call upon 
the supernatural or divine in order to account for the presence of creativity in the 
natural realm. Indeed, as argued by David Bohm (1996), creativity appears to be 
merely a natural extension of creative patterns evident in all aspects of reality 
distinct only by a specific level of awareness. To paraphrase Niels Bohr, humanity 
may simply be creativity’s way of looking at itself.
Artificial creativity
The history of artificial creativity can be classified in several different ways. 
Scientific and philosophical debates about the underlying notion of creativity 
and design and the distinction between supernatural and natural creativity have 
taken place for centuries if not millennia. From William Paley’s arguments for the 
necessity of an intelligent designer for “complex adaptive systems” (Spector, 2006), 
exemplified by the history of automata and machines imitating life as corollaries 
of “god the divine watchmaker who constructed them and set them in motion” 
(Williams, 1978), through to Darwin’s demonstration of complexity emerging 
through simple processes over time, and changes in scientific perspective resulting 
from the emergence of computation and psychology, conceptions of real and 
artificial continue a dynamic arena of discourse. The term ‘artificial creativity’ itself 
emerged through the field of computing in the 1950s and is now well established. 
Boden (1998), highlights the significance of artificial intelligence in creativity 
research, most notably in terms of the potential for increased levels of scientific 
objectivity and control, an example of which being the work of Saunders and Gero 
(2006a/b/c) who, drawing from Csikszentmihalyi’s systems view of creativity, study 
the dynamics of novelty selection through controlled computer algorithms. 
The underlying questions of ownership and authorship and attribution in the 
digital arts (what is human, what is machine?) continue to present significant 
challenges in the interpretation and determination of creative quality and value. 
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Whilst the development of artificial intelligence represents a remarkable feat 
of creativity in and of itself, as does the considerable technical sophistication of 
modern computer-based tools routinely involved in the creative manipulation of 
media, the questions of how the presence of machinery and technology impacts 
on the authenticity or creative value associated with a given example can vary 
significantly. On the one hand, creativity emerging authentically from an AI source 
would undoubtedly be accepted, however ultimately interpreted, whereas where 
origination or attribution becomes complex or difficult to define, the attribution 
of creativity becomes at best speculative if not entirely unstable through the use 
of technology. In the context of digital arts disciplines and music in particular, the 
authorship of sound elements can require careful transparency to substantiate 
authorship and originality. Sophisticated digital editing tools and unprecedented 
access to component materials and patterns render any representation of original 
musical creativity subject to innumerable questions of influence, process, tools and 
techniques. 
Fakery, forgery and integrity
In August 2013, the New York Times published a new article about a court case 
involving art forgery. Not a historically novel event in itself, there being historical 
attempts at forgery recorded in line with the commercial value of reproducible art, 
the case demonstrates a key factor in the determination of creative value and in 
the factor of attribution and originality. Involving the fraudulent production and 
sale by auction of newly discovered ‘Titans of Modernism’ (Cohen and Rashbaum, 
2013), $80 Million in auction sales were generated for work commissioned for 
mere thousands of dollars. Simply speaking, artwork indistinguishable from that 
produced by an ‘original’ artist, has a commercial ratio of value of an approximate 
factor of 1:1000 purely on the basis of authorship context with ‘discovery’ leading 
to the effective annulment of the previous estimation of value. What the painting 
‘looks like’ being a mere 0.1% factor in the commercial value in this example. Whilst 
there are of course complexities of legality related to breach of faith and other 
mitigating factors, the example nevertheless demonstrates that creative value can 
vary significantly and independently of the creative object itself. 
Provenance and the origination and historical significance of artwork remains 
critical to at least commercial value; the death of the artist and consequent inability 
for continued production plus the passage of time and consequent antique status 
elevating certain individual paintings to extraordinary auction values. As well as 
provenance, a range of factors are identifiable as significant in the determination 
of creative value. Whilst the fake modernist paintings represent a stark example of 
how provenance and authenticity can compromise value, numerous other ‘non-
functional’ narratives feed the decoding of creative artefacts: 
1. Artistic value: The basic aesthetic integrity and qualities perceivable by the 
receiver.
2. Cultural impact value: The level and quality of cultural impact over time.
3. Historic value: The perceived association with wider historical events and 
age (overlap with rarity and political value).
4. Rarity value: The basic economic laws of supply and demand.
5. Cultural trend value: Cultural dynamics informing focus on ‘currency’.
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6. Innovation value: Judgement as to the novelty value and influence.
7. Novelty value: Judgement as to the commonality with lived experience and 
level of contrast/contrarianism.
8. Germinal impact value: Level of impact in terms of replication and influence.
9. Craft and technique value: Related to point 1, the quality of artistry or 
manipulation of related materials.
10. Political value: The political context of the artwork and the ideological 
context of the art or the reception of the art.
11. Esoteric value: Abstract factors including previous ownership or object 
history.
Ultimately, fakery and forgery are fundamental to the development of technique 
in the arts. The development of pastiche has formed part of formal artistic study 
for centuries and continues to inform learning and teaching strategies at all levels 
of education. Competent modelling of artistic practices in particular, support the 
development of competence with different artistic forms and styles as well as the 
technical knowledge of production. Whilst attribution is more straightforward in 
more structured circumstances, over time it becomes more difficult to identify the 
distinction between the origination of new artistic ideas and the recollection of 
artistic experience. For example, from deliberate musical quotation to disputed 
originality of musical ideas and pursuit of legal action, a fake may be worth less than 
the original in terms of innovation value, but nevertheless much more valuable in 
many other respects. The very concept of tradition or indeed musical genre being 
predicated on the shared use of specific musical attributes, ownership becomes a 
fluid concept and, as observed by Howard Dietz, “composers shouldn’t think too 
much--it interferes with their plagiarism” (in Barber, 1998).
In education, fakery is a concern in the form of academic plagiarism where 
consistent attribution of sources and authorial integrity are subject to often 
stringent regulation and enforcement. In music, originality is subject to different 
levels of interpretation in the context of creative value. Firstly, whilst there are 
many parallels between text and music in terms of grammar, syntax, language and 
form, the stylistic context of new musical ideas provides for structures arguably 
more stringent than that of written language and the conventions associated with 
instrumentation, musical language and form, dictate that a level of unoriginality or 
use of established conventions is necessary for meaningful reception. Furthermore, 
in an educational context predicated on mapping pedagogic approaches to the 
professional landscape like never before, prevailing standards in relevant fields 
such as the commercial music and media sectors, will be inevitably drawn into the 
maintenance of creative value judgements. To develop an original blues song, one 
must first adopt a significant number of constraints through which to express that 
originality. To complete the task at a professional standard, the result must also ‘fit’ 
according to a set of additional technical and musical factors. The more generic the 
result, the more it will ‘be’ a blues song. The more original, less so. 
Serendipity, spontaneity, and accidental discovery
‘Yesterday’ by Paul McCartney is one of the most covered song in commercial 
music history,  voted the best song of the 20th century in a BBC poll in 1999, the 
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number one pop song of all time by MTV and Rolling Stone magazine in 2000, with 
some estimates indicating that the song was performed in excess of seven million 
times in the 20th century alone. Famously emerging almost musically complete in a 
dream, Paul spent considerable time playing the outline of the song to many people 
before finally accepting authorship: “Eventually it became like handing something 
into the police. I thought if no one claimed it after a few weeks then I could have it” 
(McCartney in Cross, 2005). 
That the unconscious and insight can produce such seemingly complete creative 
outputs is not uncommon. The arts, sciences, sports and indeed almost all areas 
of human endeavour are littered with stories of incredible spontaneity, discovery, 
and the unanticipated emergence of new ideas. Whilst “chance favours only the 
prepared mind” (Louis Pasteur), as the history of scientific and artistic discovery 
demonstrates, almost serendipitous moments do account for innumerable major 
changes in thinking and understanding. Many creative ideas and insights emerge 
from hidden places and unconscious processes as well as unforeseen circumstances. 
How do we account for creative value if even the originator doesn’t feel particularly 
involved in the creative act?
Succinctly characterised as the “clear and sudden understanding of how to 
solve a problem” (Bowden et al., 2005), insight, whilst potentially the proverbial 
vanishing point in terms of psychological or neurological research, is nevertheless a 
significant factor of creativity and arguably the very definition of creativity itself. The 
level of conscious awareness of the event may vary as may the level of significance 
or unlikeliness of the result but the capacity itself is has direct equivalences with 
aspects of general language processing, word-play and humour (Bowden, 2005). 
In discussing key facets of creativity, Robert Sternberg clarifies the preeminent 
position regarding expertise and creativity on any given field: “one needs to know 
enough about a field to move it forward. One can’t move beyond where a field is 
if one doesn’t know where it is” (Sternberg, 2006). Implying that a certain level of 
creativity can only emerge with a base level of expertise whilst also recognising 
the inhibiting factor of routine, there is a clear case that serendipitous experiences 
emerge at least from their home domains framed by strong foundation knowledge 
and practical expertise. However, on the subject of serendipity and creativity, it is 
noted that there is value in consideration of the accidental and naivety as important 
elements in the creative process. As recorded of Elvis Presley, “I don’t know anything 
about music. In my line you don’t have to” (Barber, 1998). In order to innovate, 
deliberacy can be required, but the accidental, the intuitive and the unintended are 
simply a matter of routine through naivety. 
Bohm (1996), categorises a typology of insight distinguishing between 
‘imaginative insight’, ‘rational insight’, ‘imaginative fancy’, and ‘rational fancy’, 
observing that whilst it may be tempting to categorise these hierarchically, they are, 
nevertheless, mutually informative processes and potentially interdependent. With 
reference to the spontaneous creativity of Lennon and McCartney’s ‘Yesterday’, the 
technical proficiency and practically ‘tuned’ focus on songwriting, melodic invention, 
chord positions and progressions, and intensive daily experience of rehearsal and 
recording sessions clearly lend themselves significantly for successful generation of 
new musical ideas of the type that ‘emerged’ (‘rational insight’). However creative 
the spontaneous outpouring of such an original and technically creative song may 
CONTEMPART ‘15
157
be in the circumstances, it would be far more surprising and arguably a much 
greater creative act had Paul emerged with insights significant to the contemporary 
work in computing or medical transplantation. The work emerged from near perfect 
conditions, relevant to established expertise. However, the inception of the Beatles 
collective musical careers was marked by both a lack of formal musical training. 
As is the case for a great many of the most significant music of the 20th century, 
creativity was the very definition of self-constructed, improvised, and the product 
of experimentation through naivety or at least in absence of formal frameworks 
supporting musical development. 
In educational assessment of creative artwork it is common for some form 
of written commentary or explanatory notes to form part of the basis of overall 
evaluation. The determination of creativity dependent in part on analysis of qualities 
intrinsic to the artefact and in part on an assessment of aspects of ownership, 
technical understanding, and the ability to explain creative development and to 
present a narrative to inform reception of the work. This presents challenges in 
several different ways; Firstly, the ability to describe or to articulate and the ability 
to develop and generate do not necessarily correlate and there is little evidence to 
suggest that an ability to describe more effectively implies the means to reproduce 
successfully; Secondly, if instinctive and intuitive approaches can be seen to 
inform effective practice, there may even be a potential for self-conscious record 
keeping and self-awareness to disrupt the creative process negatively as well as not 
providing the means of capturing it effectively; and, Thirdly, any form of creative 
assessment requiring substantiation in parallel with some of written explanation 
or description of process, can lead to the creative practice being catered towards 
that which is explainable and attributable as deliberate action. As with other 
aspects of assessment-driven learning behaviours, creative practice developed for 
the purposes of academic assessment can suffer from the unconscious mitigation 
of risk leading to banal and formulaic outcomes, designed from the assessment 
perspective backwards to map closely to safe creative territory that can ultimately 
lead to creative atrophy. 
The inability to articulate the reasons for creative decisions, and indeed even 
to know in a real sense, is an experience common to all practitioners of creative 
disciplines. Euphemistically defining artistic vision as simply that of ‘seeing what 
others don’t’ (Gary Klein), creativity can often be difficult to see even for the self. Ask 
yourself, for example, how do you construct your dreams? Even taking Emile Borel’s 
‘dactylographic monkeys’ theorem, whatever the selected work of literature being 
identified to implausibly but nevertheless probabilistically emerge from sufficient 
symians, time and typewriters, there remains the problem of identification or 
external agency. In the famous example so readily adapted and misinterpreted over 
time, the creative act would only be complete when, as with aspects of particle 
physics, exposed to recognition. 
Ultimately, there are values associated with the development of new ideas 
and new artistic expressions; there are also values inherent in the reception and 
decoding of expression. Whether deliberate should be considered more valuable 
than accidental, the explained given precedence over the unexplained, modelled 
or artificially produced considered inferior to the originated or the natural, requires 
careful consideration and evaluation.
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Authentic creativity
Creativity inherently defies concrete definition and is subject to continual 
reinterpretation and creative value is determined by intrinsic and extrinsic factors 
ranging from the practical to the esoteric. The aim in this text being to develop a 
framework understanding of creative value through which to inform practice as 
educators and creative arts practitioners and future research, there are a number 
of key conclusions; Firstly, albeit identified from the outset, any framework for the 
analysis of creative value needs to be flexible. Given that creative evaluation involves 
the consideration of the novel and then new, it is not possible to predetermine 
judgement beyond a certain extent even in the form of applicable solutions to 
concrete physical problems; Secondly, whilst understanding of creativity as a 
psychological process continues to grow, the mysterious and the uncertain remain 
consistent features of creative practice and reception and represent valuable 
experiences in their own right, capable of enrichment through educational 
processes, and; Thirdly, creativity can be judged to be authentic where a resonance 
is achieved in terms of intrinsic and extrinsic factors. In many contexts apparent in 
the synergies evident in ideas that ‘have their time’, both those born of necessity 
and those of opportunity, authenticity can be considered independently of quality 
with respect to level descriptors, but nevertheless also as a significant aspect of 
creative experience. 
Authentic creativity can be described in many ways according to perspective of 
appreciation. As practitioners, creative experience is the primary driver for practice. 
Whilst there is satisfaction in the completion of a particular project, the deepest 
fulfilment invariably falls elsewhere ‘within’ the process. This process may not 
always be pleasant, understood, deliberate, or indeed entirely original or organic, 
but is always central to the inception and the integrity of creative events. 
Bibliography
Amabile, T., 1996. Creativity in Context, Westview Press, USA. 
Barber, D. W. ed., 1998. Better Than It Sounds: A Dictionary of Humorous Musical 
Quotations, Sound and Vision, Toronto. 
Bateson, G., 1972. Steps to an ecology of mind: collected essays in anthropology, 
psychiatry, evolution and epistemology, Jason Aronson Inc. 
Beghetto, R. A., 2008. Does assessment kill creativity? The Educational Forum, 
Taylor and Francis, Vol 69, Issue 3, pp. 254-263. 
Boden, M., 1998. Creativity and Artificial Intelligence, Journal of Artificial 
Intelligence, 103, pp. 347-356. 
Bohm, D., (Nichol, L., Ed.) (1996) On Creativity, Routledge, New York. 
Bowden, E., Jung-Beeman, M., Fleck, J., & Kounios, (2005) New approaches to 
demystifying insight, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Vol.9 No.7 July 2005.
Clark, R. E (2002) Performance Assessment in the Arts, Kappa Delta Pi Record, 
Vol 39, Issue 1, Taylor and Francis.
Clegg, P., 2008. Creativity and critical thinking in the globalised university, 
Journal of Innovations in Education and Teaching International, Vol. 45, No. 3, 
August 2008, 219-226, Routledge.
Cohen, P & Rashbaum, W. K (2013) One Queens Painter Created Forgeries That 
CONTEMPART ‘15
159
Sold for Millions, U.S. Says, New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/16/
nyregion/one-queens-painter-created-forgeries-that-sold-for-millions-us-says.
html?_r=0 
Cropley, A. J., 2010. Defining and Measuring Creativity: Are Creativity Tests 
Worth Using?, Roeper Review, Issue 72, Vol 23, No. 2.
Cross, C., 2005. The Beatles: Day-by-Day, Song-by-Song, Record-by-Record. 
Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, Inc. 
Eisner, E. W., and Day, M. D., 2004. Handbook of Research and Policy in Art 
Education, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Kaufman, J. C., and Beghetto, R. A., 2009. Beyond Big and Little: The 4C Model of 
Creativity, Review of General Psychology, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp 1-12.
Kaufman, J., and Sternberg, R., eds., 2010. The Cambridge Handbook of 
Creativity, Cambridge University Press. 
Lebuda, I., and Karwowski, M., 2013. Tell me your name and I’ll tell you how 
creative your work is: Author’s name and gender as factors influencing assessment 
of product’s creativity in four different domains, Creativity Research Journal, Vol 25, 
Issue 1, pp. 137-142.
Ristau, C. A., ed., 2014; 1991. Cognitive Ethology: The Minds of Other Animals, 
Psychology Press.
Runco, M. A., and Jaeger, G. J., 2012. The Standard Definition of Creativity, 
Creativity Research Journal, Vol 24, issue 1.
Saunders, R., and Giro, J. S., 2006a. Artificial Creativity: A Synthetic Approach to 
the Study of Creative Behaviour, The Key Centre of Design Computing and Cognition, 
Department of Architectural and Design Science, University of Sydney, NSW, 2006, 
Australia.
Saunders, R., and Giro, J. S., 2006b. How to Study Artificial Creativity, The Key 
Centre of Design Computing and Saunders, R., & Giro, J. S., (2006b) Cognition, 
Department of Architectural and Design Science, University of Sydney, NSW, 2006, 
Australia.
Saunders, R., and Giro, J. S., 2006c. Artificial Creativity: Emergent Notions of 
Creativity in Artificial Societies of Curious Agents, Department of Architectural and 
Design Science, University of Sydney, NSW, 2006, Australia.
Schmid, D. W., 2003. Authentic Assessment in the Arts: Empowering students 
and Teachers, Journal of Dance Education, Vol 3, Issue 2, Taylor and Francis. 
Spector, L., 2006. Evolution of Artificial Intelligence, Journal of Artificial 
Intelligence, 170 (2006), pp. 1251–1253.
Schmidthuber, J., 2006. Developmental Robotics, Optimal Artificial Curiosity, 
Creativity, Music, and the Fine Arts, Connection Science, vol. 18 (2), p 173-187.
Silvia, P. J., 2015. Intelligence and creativity are pretty similar after all, Educational 
Psychology review, Springer, US. Feb. 2015.
Silvia, P. J., Wigert, B., Reiter-Palmon, R., and Kaufman, J. C., 2012. Assessing 
creativity with self-report scales: A review and empirical evaluation, Journal of 
Psychology, Aesthetics, Creativity and the Arts, Vol 6(1), pp. 19-34. 
Sternberg, R., 2006. Creating a Vision of Creativity: The First 25 Years, Psychology 
of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, Vol. S, No. 1, 2–12.
Tornkvist, S., 1998. Creativity: Can It Be Taught? The Case of Engineering 
Education, European Journal of Engineering Education, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1998.
160
CONTEMPART ‘15
Williams, Dr J. M., 1978. Antique Mechanical Computers, BYTE Publications.
Wilson, C., and Brown, M., 2013. Extending Realities: Creativity, Artistry 
and Technology, in Reisman, F., ed., ‘Creativity: Process, Product, Personality, 
Environment & Technology’. KIE Conference book series. ISBN: 978-1-85924-202-5.
Wilson, S., 1995. Artificial intelligence research as art, SEHR, volume 4, issue 2: 
Constructions of the Mind, Stanford University Press. 
